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Executive	Summary	
A growing number of local affordable homeownership initiatives allow income-eligible families to 
purchase homes at below-market prices and, in return for the subsidized purchase price, the 
owner’s potential capital gains from the resale of the home are limited by resale restrictions. 
These long-term affordable ownership programs are known by different names in different parts of 
the country, but in recent years the term “Shared Equity Homeownership” has been increasingly 
used to describe them. By creating a stock of homes that resell for prices that remain within the 
reach of lower income households, shared equity programs can serve a larger number of families 
for the same amount of subsidy dollars, when compared to programs in which families are 
provided grants to purchase their homes and then allowed to pocket these public subsidies and a 
hundred percent of their property’s capital gains when they resell.  
Although shared equity homeownership programs have been in place for many years, there are 
relatively few empirical studies that document their benefits. A major reason for the lack of 
information about these programs is the difficulty of collecting client-level information about 
families who purchase homes under such programs, particularly across multiple sites. This study 
fills such a void. It presents outcomes for seven shared equity programs: the Champlain Housing 
Trust (CHT), located in Burlington, Vermont; Northern Communities Land Trust (NCLT) in Duluth, 
Minnesota; Thistle Community Housing in Boulder, Colorado; the Dos Pinos Housing Cooperative 
in Davis, California; Wildwood Park Towne Houses in Atlanta, Georgia; A Regional Coalition for 
Housing (ARCH) in eastern King County, Washington, and the San Francisco Citywide 
Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program. Using client-level data reported by each of the 
programs, we analyzed the following four issues: preserving affordability, personal wealth 
creation, security of tenure, mobility. 
Our findings, summarized below, show that these shared equity programs are successful in 
creating homeownership opportunities for lower income families that allow purchasers to 
accumulate assets, while, at the same time, creating a stock of affordable housing that remains 
within the financial reach of subsequent lower income homebuyers. Moreover, homeownership 
among shared equity programs is sustainable: only a very small number of shared equity 
homeowners lose their home because of foreclosure; and a very high percentage of these low-
income, first-time homeowners (over 90 percent in the three programs for which data were 
available) remain homeowners five years after purchasing a shared equity home. Finally, shared 
equity homeowners are not trapped: they resell their homes with the same frequency and for the 
same reasons as other homeowners. In the three programs for which we were able to obtain 
information about the subsequent housing situations of these movers, we found that over two-
thirds of them moved into owner-occupied, market-rate housing after reselling their shared equity 
homes.  The following discussion summarizes our key findings detailed in the study. 
  
• Affordability: Are the programs effective in creating and preserving affordability for low- 
and moderate-income homebuyers by restricting price appreciation so that homes, upon 
resale, require a later buyer to earn no more real income than the initial purchaser?  
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The median incomes (in 2008 $) of the households purchasing a shared equity home in all 
seven programs were well below the median family income (MFI) of the surrounding areas 
in which the programs operated. At the median, the programs sold homes to families 
between 35 and 73 percent of the HUD-determined area median family income. In addition 
to serving families earning well below the median income, these programs served a very 
high share of first-time homebuyers. One site (San Francisco) is limited to first-time 
homebuyers. Three other programs—NCLT, CHT, and Thistle served primarily first-time 
homeowners. At Dos Pinos, first-time homeownership rates are lower as many residents 
move to other units within the co-op as their families change size. 
Our analysis began by calculating the change in average real minimum income required to 
purchase a home, comparing the cost of buying a home when it was initially purchased to 
the cost of buying that same home when it was resold to another income-eligible 
household. The largest increase in cost occurred at ARCH and NCLT (4.0 and 1.9 percent 
per year, respectively). The minimum income required to purchase resold homes at Dos 
Pinos decreased by 1.6 percent and, for Wildwood, 0.7 percent (i.e., the co-op fee, in 
constant dollars, declined over time) per year. At the remaining three sites, the cost of 
buying resold homes increased by no more than 1.1 percent per year.  And, a majority of 
units sold across 6 of the 7 programs had a required real income at resale that was within 
10 percent of the initial real required income.  
Our analysis then evaluated the gain or loss in affordability for resold homes at each of the 
study sites by calculating the ratio of the minimum income required to purchase a home to 
an area’s MFI and looking at the change in this ratio between when each home was 
purchased and sold. Therefore, if the required minimum income for a home is 50 percent 
of MFI at its initial sale, and then 54 percent at resale, the ratio increased by 4 percentage 
points. 
The median change in this ratio decreased for two sites: Thistle and Dos Pinos. Two sites 
saw a small change in the ratio: Wildwood (0.3 percentage points) and the Champlain 
Housing Trust (0.9 percentage points); NCLT saw a modest increase of 1.7 percentage 
points. The remaining two sites (ARCH and San Francisco) had larger changes in the ratio 
for resold homes. However, even in communities where some erosion of affordability 
occurred, homes were resold at prices that remained affordable to buyers well below the 
area median income, In sum, our analyses of changes to required income (whether 
measured in absolute or relative terms) reached the same conclusion: resold units across 
all of the programs have remained affordable to households with incomes well below the 
area median. 
 
• Personal Wealth: Are the programs effective in building wealth for individual households, 
providing opportunities for financial gains that are unavailable to renters? 
In all seven programs the median rate of return realized by resellers ranged between a low 
of 6.5 percent at Dos Pinos to a high of 59.6 percent at ARCH. The median rate of return 
for resellers in all programs except for Dos Pinos was greater than the return that sellers 
would have realized if they had rented a unit and invested their down payment in either the 
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stock market or purchased a 10-year Treasury bond at the time that they purchased their 
home. Had resellers invested their down payment amount in an S&P 500 index fund, they 
would have earned a median return ranging from a low of -0.1 percent in Thistle to a high 
of 10.6 percent in Dos Pinos. A comparable investment in 10-year Treasury bonds would 
have yielded a return, at the median, between 4.4 percent (in San Francisco) and 7.8 
percent (in Dos Pinos). 
 
• Security of Tenure: Are the programs effective in maintaining homeownership by avoiding 
delinquency and foreclosure? 
 
Although homeowners earn well below median incomes, very few had residential loans 
that were in delinquency or foreclosure. In the two cooperative programs, no owners are 
currently delinquent. The other programs ranged from a delinquency rate of 0.4 to 2.7 
percent. Looking at foreclosure rates, three programs—Wildwood Park, Dos Pinos, and 
Thistle—had no homes presently in foreclosure as of the end of 2009. The highest 
foreclosure rates were in CHT, at 1.4 percent and NCLT, at 1.1 percent. In every program 
but one, the site’s foreclosure rates were below that of their surrounding areas as of 2009. 
Looking over the life of these programs, the two limited equity cooperatives have never 
had a foreclosure. Thistle and ARCH had a cumulative foreclosure rate of just 0.6 percent. 
CHT and NCLT had somewhat higher foreclosure rates—2.8 and 3.0 percent—although in 
neither program has a home ever been lost from the program’s portfolio because of 
foreclosure. A final measure of how effective these shared equity programs have been in 
helping low income families not only to attain homeownership but to sustain it is the 
percentage of buyers who remain homeowners five years after they purchase a home. For 
the three sites where we have data, over 91 percent of buyers were still homeowners after 
five years, much higher than the national norm of 50 percent for first-time, low-income 
homeowners. 
 
• Mobility: Are program participants able to sell their shared-equity homes and move into 
other housing and neighborhoods of their choice? 
 
It does not appear that the owners of shared equity homes are moving at substantially 
lower rates than other first-time homebuyers. Annual turnover in the programs ranged from 
5.5 percent at CHT to 8.6 percent at Dos Pinos. The median length of tenure for movers in 
most sites was three to four years, with two sites slightly higher: CHT and Wildwood 
resellers lived in their home 5.2 and 6.6 years, respectively. Most owners report leaving 
their homes not due to financial stress, but in response to family, life cycle, and 
employment changes. In two programs—NCLT and CHT—most movers resettle near the 
home they are leaving. By contrast, at two programs where housing costs are high in the 
neighborhoods surrounding their shared equity homes —Dos Pinos and Thistle— resellers 
tended to move further than the national average. Of the four sites for which we had data 
about the subsequent housing situations of residents who had sold their shared equity 
homes, all of them reported a high proportion of movers transitioning into another owner-
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occupied home. At three of the sites, most of these movers purchased market-rate, owner-
occupied housing: 68 percent at CHT; 72 percent at Thistle, and 78 percent at NCLT. At 
the Dos Pinos cooperative, 54 percent of the movers purchased market-rate, owner-
occupied homes, 42 percent shifted to rental housing, and 4 moved in with a family 
member subsequent to leaving their Dos Pinos home. 
The results of our analysis of seven shared equity programs show that they deliver on their dual 
objective of providing sustainable homeownership that generates wealth-building opportunities for 
lower income families while maintaining a stock of affordably priced owner-occupied housing. In 
the wake of the recent foreclosure crisis, some housing market analysts are questioning the 
benefits of promoting homeownership, particularly for lower income families. But, as the results of 
this study show, shared equity programs allow low-income families to realize the financial benefits 
of homeownership with less risk of losing their homes to foreclosure. Therefore, shared equity 
programs could be an important part of a policy response to promote sustainable homeownership 
for lower income families in the future.  
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1. Introduction	
Owning a home, traditionally, has been one of the most important ways for American families to 
gain a secure hold over their housing. It has also been a way to accumulate wealth, especially for 
lower income households.1 Moreover, homeowners tend to be more satisfied with their homes 
and neighborhoods and contribute towards the stability of their communities though increased 
levels of local volunteer activities.2 Consequently, there are a wide range of public policies that 
promote homeownership, particularly among lower income households. While some of these 
policies provide subsidized mortgages to income-eligible households, many policies rely on 
innovative mortgage products that allow families with lower incomes to qualify for loans that they 
otherwise could not afford.3 These market innovations succeeded in increasing the nation’s 
homeownership rate from 67.5 percent in the Q4 of 2000 to 69.0 percent in the Q4 of 2005.4 The 
homeownership rate increased over this time period even though house prices rose, according to 
the Case/Shiller house price index, by 83 percent. 
This increase in homeownership, however, proved not to be sustainable; the homeownership rate 
declined to 67.1 percent in the Q1 2010.5 The decline in homeownership is due, in part, to the 
increased number of foreclosures, many of which result from families no longer being able to pay 
their mortgages after a combination of an interest rate reset, income loss and declining property 
values.6 The mortgage crisis and housing crash has taught us a valuable lesson: that many of our 
policies implemented to increase homeownership rates, particularly among lower income 
households, are not sustainable, and may have done more harm than good. 
Consequently, it is critical to separate initiatives that promote sustainable homeownership, which 
result in long-term benefits to lower income households and the neighborhoods in which they 
reside from the failed policies of the past decade. The high costs of housing mean that even entry 
level homes are frequently priced above what many lower-income families can sustainably afford. 
For this reason, many affordable homeownership programs provide purchase assistance loans or 
grants which bring the cost of homeownership within reach of income targeted buyers. While 
many of these programs are structured as “down payment assistance grants” to homebuyers, 
they are increasingly providing assistance far beyond the level of a typical down payment. In an 
environment where many governments are budget constrained, there is an increasing call for the 
                                                
1 Boehm, Thomas P. and Alan M. Schlottmann. 2001. Housing and Wealth Accumulation: Intergenerational 
Impacts. http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-15.pdf  
2 Rohe, William M., Shannon Van Zandt and George McCarthy. 2001. The Social Benefits and Costs of 
Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-12.pdf. 
3 NCB Capital Impact. 2008. Shared Equity Homeownership A new path to economic opportunity. 
http://www.ncbcapitalimpact.org/uploadedFiles/downloads/SEH_Vision10-08.pdf.  
4 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS). 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html. 
5 U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2010. Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the First Quarter 2010. 
April 26. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr110/files/q110press.pdf.  
6 Kiff, John and Vladimir Klyuev. 2009. Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts in the United States: Approaches and 
Challenges http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0902.pdf. 
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program sponsor to preserve the public investment by maintaining the affordability of the assisted 
home.  
Affordability can be preserved through a very wide range of different legal and financial 
mechanisms and, complicating matters, these mechanisms themselves are frequently known by 
different names in different regions of the country. “Subsidy recapture” programs require 
homebuyers to repay public subsidies when they sell their homes. Some recapture programs 
require repayment of only the initial principal at resale, while others require repayment of principal 
along with deferred interest. Others require sellers to repay principal along with a share of any 
home price appreciation. A different approach to the same problem involves retaining the subsidy 
in the assisted home and imposing a resale price restriction which enables future buyers to 
purchase the home at an affordable price. These price restriction programs are known by many 
names including: Permanently affordable, Long-term Affordable, Limited Equity, Below Market 
Rate, Moderately Priced Dwelling Units, Deed Restricted, etc. Davis7 used the term “Shared 
Equity Homeownership” to refer to the full range of these programs which offer “resale restricted, 
owner occupied housing”, and we adopt that term here.  
As discussed below, shared equity homeownership programs provide an alternative approach 
that supports sustainable homeownership. Although there are different types of these programs, 
in general shared equity homeownership initiatives allow income-eligible families to purchase 
homes at below-market prices, thereby reducing the risk that the owner will have negative equity 
at some point in the future. In return for the subsidized purchase price, the owner’s potential 
capital gains from the resale of the home are limited by resale restrictions,8 creating a stock of 
affordable owner-occupied units with an opportunity to accumulate wealth. By creating a stock of 
homes that resell for prices that remain within the reach of lower income households, shared 
equity programs can serve a larger number of families for the same amount of subsidy dollars, 
when compared to programs in which families are provided grants to purchase their homes and 
then allowed to pocket these public subsidies and a hundred percent of their property’s capital 
gains when they resell. The resale restrictions in shared equity homeownership programs, by 
contrast, retain these subsidies in the home itself, while limiting a homeowner’s gains to 
something less than 100 percent. By this method, the homes are intended to remain affordable 
over time, eliminating (or minimizing) the need for additional subsidies to assist subsequent 
homebuyers. 
The three most common models of shared equity homeownership initiatives are community land 
trusts, limited equity cooperatives and resale-restricted, owner-occupied houses or condominiums 
with affordability covenants (i.e., deed restrictions) lasting 30 years or longer.9 Community land 
trusts provide their residents with the opportunity to own the physical structure of their home – but 
not the underlying land, which they lease from a local non-profit. This non-profit landowner (i.e., 
the CLT) either repurchases the homes at a below-market price whenever the present owners 
                                                
7 Davis, John Emmeus. 2006. Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-
restricted, Owner-occupied Housing. Montclair, NJ: National Housing Institute. 
8 NCB Capital Impact. 2008. 
9 Davis, 2006. 
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decide to resell or requires these owners to resell their homes to another income-eligible 
household for a below-market price determined by a formula embedded in the ground lease. 
Under the limited equity cooperative model, residents own shares in a cooperative housing 
corporation. They can resell these shares, but at prices that ensure continued affordability while 
allowing for modest equity growth. Deed-restricted homes provide lower income families with 
owner-occupied housing, which they may only resell to another income-eligible homebuyer for a 
formula-determined, “affordable” price. Covenants restricting the resale of these homes may 
expire after a certain number of years, or be permanent. Covenants must last for at least thirty 
years to be considered “shared equity homeownership,” under the rule of thumb adopted by most 
practitioners. 
Although shared equity homeownership programs have been in place for many years, there are 
relatively few empirical studies that document their benefits.10 A major reason for the lack of 
information about these programs is the difficulty of collecting client-level information about 
families who purchase homes under such programs, particularly across multiple sites. This study 
fills such a void. We analyze data in this report from seven programs to quantify the effects of 
shared equity homeownership initiatives across different market contexts and varied types of 
programmatic alternatives. Our hope is that the results of the study will provide practitioners, 
funders, and policymakers with a much-needed empirical foundation for making decisions about 
designing, managing, and expanding shared equity homeownership programs. 
The remaining sections of this cross-site report are organized as follows. The first section 
presents an overview of the seven sites. It is followed by a detailed case study analysis of each of 
the seven sites. After discussing the data and methods employed in this research, the cross-site 
report introduces the seven sites, their clients, and their local housing markets. We then present 
analyses that address the following programmatic outcomes:  
• Affordability: Are the programs effective in creating and preserving affordability for low- 
and moderate-income homebuyers? 
• Personal Wealth: Are the programs effective in building wealth for individual households, 
providing opportunities for financial gains that are unavailable to renters? 
• Security of Tenure: Are the programs effective in maintaining homeownership by avoiding 
delinquency and foreclosure? 
• Mobility: Are program participants able to sell their shared-equity homes and move into 
other housing and neighborhoods of their choice? 
 
                                                
10 For existing studies, see, for example, Davis, John E. and Amy Demetrowitz. 2003. Permanently 
Affordable Homeownership: Does the Community Land Trust Deliver on Its Promises. Burlington, VT: 
Burlington Community Land Trust; Davis, John E. and Alice Stokes. 2009. Lands in Trust, Homes that Last. 
Burlington, VT: Champlain Housing Trust; and Gent, Cathleen Will Sawyer, John E. Davis, and Alison 
Weber. 2005. Evaluating the Benefits of Living in the Burlington Community Land Trust’s Rental Housing or 
Cooperative Housing. Burlington, VT: Center for Regional Studies. 
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2. Data	and	Methods	
NCB Capital Impact and the Urban Institute selected a diverse group of programs for study to 
maximize learning across different geographies, housing markets, and program models. 
Programs were required to have accumulated a portfolio of at least 60 resale-restricted, owner-
occupied homes, to have had at least 40 resales within that portfolio, and to have maintained 
adequate and accessible records on their homebuyers. This evaluation assessed outcomes for 
three community land trusts (CLTs): the Champlain Housing Trust, located in Burlington, Vermont, 
Northern Communities Land Trust in Duluth, Minnesota, and Thistle Community Housing in 
Boulder, Colorado. We reviewed two limited equity cooperatives (LECs): the Dos Pinos Housing 
Cooperative in Davis, California, and Wildwood Park Towne Houses in Atlanta, Georgia. Finally, 
the study included two deed-restricted programs: A Regional Coalition for Housing in eastern King 
County, Washington, and the San Francisco Citywide Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program. 
We calculated client- and program-level outcomes for these seven shared equity homeownership 
programs using information provided by the sites and created relevant benchmarks for 
comparisons using yields of 10-year Treasury bonds and stocks, measured by changes to the 
S&P 500 index. For each site, we developed a data collection protocol, consisting of client-level 
administrative data, a mobility survey of clients, and a program-level summary. A copy of the 
protocol can be seen in Appendix A. 
The administrators for each of these shared equity homeownership programs were tasked with 
providing client-level data for every sale on housing prices, incomes, dates of home purchase, 
mortgage rates and terms, delinquencies and foreclosures, and other factors. Some sites 
maintained this information as administrative records in easily accessible electronic databases. 
Other sites undertook a labor-intensive process of searching hard-copy forms and county records 
to assemble this information. As described in each detailed case study, not every site was able to 
provide complete information for each element of interest. In some cases we had access to a 
sample of homeowner records (for example, only those residents who had resold their home), 
while some sites were not able to provide information about some topics for any residents. 
In addition, to get at outcomes not available through administrative records, we designed a short 
web-based survey of program participants who have moved to answer key questions about the 
nature of that move. Because of the difficulty in finding residents who sold their homes and moved 
away from the program, the survey collected information about residents who have moved from 
the development since 2000. Only four of the seven programs maintain current contact 
information on their former homeowners, allowing only these programs to conduct the survey. 
Finally, using program information and interviews with program staff, each site provided the 
answers to several program-level questions to assist in our understanding and description of their 
particular approach to shared equity homeownership. 
Before collecting any data, we explained the template and procedures we would be using in a 
one-on-one webinar with each site. We answered questions staff had about the data collection 
process as they arose. After receiving the data, we conducted an extensive quality-control 
process that involved checking for outliers and inconsistencies. This process helped to reduce 
errors and ensured that variables were consistently defined across sites. 
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3. Description	of	the	Programs	and	Their	Clients		
The seven shared equity homeownership programs described in this report vary considerably with 
respect to the markets they serve, the homebuyers they target, and the formulas and methods 
they use in maintaining the affordability of their homes. This section briefly summarizes the 
programs and their clients. 
A Regional Coalition for Housing (ARCH) was created in 1992 through an agreement of several 
municipalities in eastern King County, Washington to create and preserve the supply of housing 
for low- and moderate-income households. Through December 2009, ARCH had sold homes to 
722 families, including 186 resales. Each of the 15 cities in east King County is a voluntary 
member of ARCH. 
The Champlain Housing Trust (CHT), a non-profit organization located in Burlington, Vermont, 
was created in 2006 in a merger between the Burlington Community Land Trust and Lake 
Champlain Housing Development Corporation, both of which were founded by the City of 
Burlington in 1984. By the end of 2009, CHT had acquired a total of 450 resale-restricted, owner-
occupied houses and condominiums. Because some of these homes have been resold one or 
more times without leaving CHT’s portfolio, a total of 683 families have been helped to buy a 
home through Champlain Housing Trust’s CLT program. 
All homes in the Dos Pinos Housing Cooperative (Dos Pinos) were constructed on a 4-acre parcel 
of land in Davis, California between 1985 and 1986. The smallest shared equity program in the 
study, this 60-unit limited-equity cooperative had provided homeownership opportunities to 276 
families through 2009.  
The Northern Communities Land Trust (NCLT) in Duluth, Minnesota, started providing 
homeownership opportunities in the Duluth area to low-and moderate-income families in 1994. A 
non-profit organization, NCLT had sold homes to 232 families through 2009, including 47 resales, 
where the same price-restricted home was successively purchased by more than one income-
eligible family. 
The San Francisco Citywide Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program (San Francisco), 
administered by the Mayor’s Office of Housing, is an inclusionary zoning program that requires 
developers to sell or rent 15 to 20 percent of units in new residential developments at a “below-
market-rate” price that is affordable to low- or middle-income households. The program, begun in 
1992, currently generates approximately 100 resale-restricted, owner-occupied homes a year. 
Largest among the sites in this study, the program administers a total homeownership portfolio of 
over 800 units. 
Thistle Community Housing’s community land trust (Thistle), began offering homeownership 
opportunities to low-and moderate-income families in Boulder County, Colorado in 1996. Through 
December 2009, Thistle had sold homes to 172 families. Included in this total were 69 resales. 
Wildwood Park Towne Houses (Wildwood), located in Atlanta, Georgia, was constructed in five 
phases from 1968 through 1971. This limited equity housing cooperative, serving low-income 
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households, was developed with federal assistance under HUD’s Section 236 Interest Reduction 
Program. The manager for this 268-unit cooperative has information on 140 resales that took 
place since 1972.  
All programs we studied use a formula to determine the maximum price for which its homes may 
be resold. While these formulas establish only the maximum price a home can sell for, and do not 
guarantee a homeowner can find a willing buyer at that price, in almost all cases across the seven 
program, homes are resold for this maximum price. These resale controls are enforced by six of 
the seven programs by closely monitoring direct seller-to-buyer transfers from one income-eligible 
resident to the next. Only the Champlain Housing Trust repurchases each home itself when an 
owner wishes to move and then resells that home for an affordable price to an income-eligible 
buyer.  
The CLTs in our study all calculate the change in a home’s appraised value to determine the 
home’s maximum purchase price at resale. NCLT allows sellers to take 30 percent of the market 
appreciation of the property, while Thistle lets sellers keep 25 percent of the appreciation times 
their investment share.11 CHT uses both methods, giving condominium owners 25 percent of their 
home’s appreciation while owners of single family homes receive up to 25 percent of the 
appreciation times their investment share. 
The two LECs use non-real estate based indices to determine purchase price. In its bylaws, 
Wildwood sets the maximum annual increase in share price for each year. Because of this, when 
a buyer purchases a share in Wildwood, she knows exactly how much she will be able to sell for 
(dependant on how long she lives in the home). Dos Pinos allows share prices to increase 
annually by the prime rate at the beginning of the year. 
San Francisco’s Citywide Program and ARCH, the deed covenant programs we studied, have 
each used several different formulas over their histories. In San Francisco, most resellers now 
use a formula that indexes sales price to the area median income, while most resale prices in 
ARCH are based on the average of the Seattle metropolitan area’s median income and a local 
real estate index. 
In addition to the resale formulas described above, each program allows resellers to increase the 
purchase price based on any capital improvements made. Resellers in three programs—ARCH, 
CHT, and NCLT—can increase the purchase price by the full appraised value of the improvement. 
Thistle and San Francisco’s Citywide Program allow resellers to recoup all money spent on the 
improvement, although San Francisco caps the increase at 7 percent of the initial purchase price. 
In Dos Pinos, resellers can add the cost of improvements to the resale price of their shares in the 
first year, but this addition decreases by 10 percent of the cost for each of the next 7 years of 
ownership; resellers can only increase the sales price by 30 percent of capital improvement costs 
if they sell after those 7 years. Finally, buyers and sellers of Wildwood’s homes can negotiate the 
value of capital improvements. However, looking across the seven programs, we found no 
                                                
11 For example, if a Thistle buyer initially pays $80,000 for a home appraised at $100,000, and the home 
increases in value to a $150,000 appraisal by resale, the owner can increase the price of the property by 
25% x 80% x $50,000 = $10,000. The homeowner may resell her home, therefore, for $90,000. 
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systematic relationship between capital improvement policies and owners’ actual investments in 
their properties. 
To facilitate transactions, four of the sites (NCLT, ARCH, Dos Pinos, and Thistle) maintain waiting 
lists of interested potential buyers. Only NCLT requires buyers to come from this list. In addition to 
overseeing these transactions, many sites require, provide, or refer residents to homeownership 
counseling. Four sites (CHT, San Francisco’s Citywide Program, NCLT, and Thistle) require 
prospective buyers to complete counseling before purchasing a home, and two of these sites 
(CHT and NCLT) provide the counseling themselves. ARCH requires counseling for those on its 
optional wait list. 
After new residents have purchased a home, only the three CLTs we studied provide optional 
counseling or classes, including specialized counseling for those in danger of delinquency or 
foreclosure. Two of these land trusts (CHT and NCLT) also occasionally provide financial 
assistance to owners who fall behind on their mortgage payments. 
The median incomes (in 2008 $) of the households purchasing a shared equity home in all seven 
programs were well below the median family income of the surrounding areas in which the 
programs operated (Table 1).12 This was also true for Dos Pinos, the only program we studied 
that does not require its homeowners to be income-eligible when buying into the cooperative. The 
median income of the purchasers of Dos Pinos’ shares was 73 percent of HUD-determined 
median income in Yolo County. The purchasers of shares in the Wildwood Park co-op in Atlanta, 
by contrast, had an average income that was only 35 percent of Fulton County’s median family 
income. This was probably because the share prices for Wildwood were relatively modest, with 
the median share price in this co-op selling for $5,500 in 2008 $. In addition, Wildwood’s residents 
could finance some of the share price (the median share loan was for 75 percent of the purchase 
price) with a loan that typically had a term of five years.  
The higher median income of Dos Pinos’ residents was due mostly to the higher median price for 
Dos Pinos’ shares. In 2008 $, this purchase price was $18,363, and none of these purchases 
were financed with a share loan. Dos Pinos’ buyers needed to accumulate a relatively large 
amount of savings (or access to financing from sources other than a private lender), which could 
explain the reason for that co-op serving higher income families than the other sites. The 
remaining sites served buyers with incomes that ranged between 45 percent and 60 percent of 
the area’s median family income. 
 
                                                
12 CHT in Burlington and San Francisco restricted sales of their homes to purchasers with an income no 
more than 100 percent of area median family income, while Thistle and Wildwood Park restricted sales of 
their program’s homes or shares to purchasers with an income no more than 80 percent of the median area 
family income. The other sites did not restrict the income of purchasers. 
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Table 1: Summary of Purchasers’ Incomes Compared to Median Family Income (in 2008 $) 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Median household 
income of 
purchasers $48,527  $36,660  $59,709  $51,988  $28,213  $38,670  $24,545  
HUD 2008 median 
family income for 
surrounding metro 
area $81,400  $70,100  $94,300  $71,000  $58,900  $85,000  $69,200  
Household income 
of purchasers of 
shared equity 
homes as % of 
(HUD) area median 
family income 60% 52% 63% 73% 48% 45% 35% 
Program income 
restrictions as 
percent of HUD 
median family 
income None 100% 100% None None 80% 80% 
Note: All dollar amounts are in 2008 $ 
Sources: Authors’ calculations of client-level data and HUD median family income 
 
In addition to serving families earning well below the median income, these programs served a 
very high share of first-time homebuyers. San Francisco’s program is limited to first-time 
homebuyers, so 100 percent of the program’s beneficiaries had never before owned a home. 
Four of the other programs maintained information on this population. First-time homeowners 
accounted for 85 percent of Thistle’s buyers, and about 90 percent of NCLT’s and CHT’s 
homebuyers. The share of first-time homebuyers was lower at Dos Pinos (40 percent). Program 
staff report this is likely the case since many households move from one home in Dos Pinos to 
another as their family size changes. Significantly, these programs were able to sustain 
homeownership for most of their buyers even though a large proportion of them were first-time 
homeowners and many were low-income. 
 
4. Home	Prices,	Subsidy,	and	Financing	Their	Purchase	
This section presents information about the sales prices for shared equity homes and analyzes 
these prices relative to their market value. In addition, this section analyzes the methods used by 
shared equity homebuyers to finance their purchases. 
 
Sales and appraised prices 
The sales prices of homes purchased for the non-co-op programs ranged from a low of $87,600 
(in 2008 $) for NCLT homes in Duluth to nearly $300,000 for homes sold in San Francisco. All 
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four programs that had appraisal information reported that homes are sold and resold for prices 
that are well below market. In San Francisco, the median appraised value of the homes made 
available to lower income buyers under the city-wide inclusionary housing program was $542,783 
(in 2008 $), nearly $270,000 more than the median price for which these homes actually sold. 
Because of this great difference, the sales prices in San Francisco represent a median of only 
48.9 percent of appraised values. The difference in appraised value and sales price in the other 
three programs that provided this data was less dramatic: $30,258 in Duluth, $37,860 in 
Burlington, and nearly $51,000 in Boulder; each represent discounts off the appraised value, at 
median, of more than 25 percent (Table 2).13  
Table 2: Comparison of Sales Prices and Market Values for Homes Sold under Shared 
Equity Programs 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable Housing 
Program NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Duluth) (Boulder) 
Median sales price paid by 
homeowner $209,656  $104,908  $289,409  $87,615  $127,519  
Median appraised value of 
homes at sale n/av $141,626  $542,783  $119,773  $194,689  
Median difference between 
appraised value and sales price n/av $37,860  $268,445  $30,258  $50,955  
Median sales price as % of 
appraised value n/av 74.9 48.9 73.7 72.9 
Median home price for 
surrounding MSA $381,000  $250,900  $824,300  $157,400  $348,800  
Median program home price as 
% of surrounding MSA 55.0 41.8 35.1 55.7 36.6 
Median appraised value of 
homes at sale as a % of 
surrounding MSA n/av 56.4 65.8 76.1 55.8 
Note: All dollar amounts are in 2008 $. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations of client-level data, American Community Survey and FHFA house price index. 
 
The difference between the appraised value and sales price is important because it quantifies the 
amount of subsidy that is recycled by these shared equity programs, as compared to more 
traditional homebuyer assistance programs in which families are provided a sizable grant to 
purchase the home with no provision for protecting that subsidy or preserving affordability on 
resale. In such a program, each homebuyer would be provided a grant for the difference between 
the appraised value of the home and the amount that the family can afford. The cost under a 
shared equity program is the same for the initial purchase of the home: in both programs a home 
is purchased for an amount that is below its market price. However, in shared equity programs, 
such homes are resold at a below market price, and so there is no need to provide the buyer of a 
                                                
13 As discussed earlier, the purchase price for co-op shares (in 2008 $) was $18,363 for Dos Pinos and 
$5,524 for Wildwood Park in Atlanta.  
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resold home with an additional subsidy, as would be required with a subsidy method that provides 
grants to buyers. 
Therefore, the shared equity programs in this study that provided appraised values for their 
homes show that their programs can serve lower income families and, at each resale, require 
between $40,000 to nearly $300,000 less than a program that would provide grants to families to 
purchase homes. The overall savings is a function of the number of resales, but the per-unit 
savings for the programs in this study indicates that the total savings is substantial, and 
underscores the cost-effective nature of the shared equity approach to promoting 
homeownership.  
Homes sold under the shared equity programs that we studied, based on their appraised value, 
are within a relatively narrow price range when compared to the median price of all homes sold 
within the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in which the program operates. In Duluth, for 
example, the median appraised value of homes (in 2008 $) sold by NCLT is 76 percent of all 
homes sold in the MSA. In three of the other sites (Burlington, San Francisco and Boulder) the 
homes sold had an appraised value of between 56 percent and 66 percent of all homes sold in 
their respective MSAs. This suggests that shared equity homes have a more modest value to 
begin with, when compared to the owner-occupied housing in the larger market, probably due to 
economic exigencies or programmatic priorities that lead the sponsors of shared equity 
homeownership programs to bring housing into their portfolios that is that is more modestly sized 
and moderately priced and that is located in less affluent areas of the MSA.  
Down payments  
One of the challenges for lower income families when considering a home purchase is to have 
sufficient funds for a down payment. With the exception of the two programs in California (San 
Francisco and Dos Pinos), shared equity homebuyers were able to purchase their houses, 
condominiums, or shares with a relatively small down payment, ranging from about $1,100 in 
Duluth to $6,000 in Boulder (Table 3). 
Table 3: Down Payments Made by Shared Equity Homebuyers 
  
Champlain 
Housing Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Down payment and 
closing costs paid by 
purchaser $2,749  $40,533  $18,363  $1,075  $6,080  $1,249  
Median % down 2.6% 13.1% 100.0% 1.3% 4.8% 24.9% 
Household income 
as % of (HUD) area 
median family 
income 
52% 63% 73% 48% 45% 35% 
Note: All dollar amounts are in 2008 $ 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data 
With the exception of Wildwood Park, the shared equity programs in which homebuyers finance a 
relatively small share of the purchase price served buyers with higher incomes when compared to 
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programs in which homebuyers financed most of the purchase price. The median down payment 
amount (in 2008 $) in the two California-based programs (San Francisco and Dos Pinos) is at 
least three times the next largest median down payment amount ($6,080 for Thistle homebuyers). 
Given that homebuyers in the California programs must make relatively large down payments, it is 
not surprising that the median incomes for the buyers of shared equity homes in San Francisco 
(63 percent) and Davis (73 percent) are greater than any of the other sites.  
Financing used by homebuyers  
Six programs provided information about the mortgages used by buyers to finance their 
purchases.14 Despite their low incomes, buyers of shared equity homes were able to secure 
mortgage financing. Nearly all homebuyers in Burlington, Duluth, King County, and Boulder 
financed a portion of their purchase with a first-lien mortgage that had a 30-year amortization 
period. A smaller percentage (71 percent) of buyers in the Wildwood co-op in Atlanta financed 
their purchase, likely because of the relatively low share price (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Financing Used by Shared Equity Homebuyers 
  
ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
First-lien 
 
     
% With first mortgage n/av 97.5 n/av 99 98.3% 71.3 
Avg. term on first mortgage 
(Share with 30-year mortgages) 
30 
(92.3%) 30 (97.6%) 30 (90.0%) 
30 yrs 
(all) 30 yrs (all) 5 yrs 
% Of first mortgages that are 
fixed rate 81.1% 97.6% 83.3% 100.0% 94.7%  n/av 
Median interest rate for first 
mortgage n/av 5.1 5.9 5.9 6.5 9.5 
Median first mortgage amount $206,881 $102,748  $227,065  $83,102  $114,509 $4,944  
Second-liens            
% With 2nd amortizing mortgage n/av 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Avg. term on second amortizing 
Mortgage 30 (50%) n/ap 30 (87.5%) n/ap n/ap n/ap 
% Of second amortizing 
mortgages that are fixed rate 94.5% n/ap fixed if known n/ap n/ap n/ap 
Median interest rate for second 
amortizing mortgage n/av n/ap 6.0 n/ap n/ap n/ap 
Median second amortizing 
mortgage amount $35,866 n/ap $9,937  n/ap n/ap n/ap 
% With non-amortizing mortgage 0.6% 2.8% 11.5% 74.0% 37.2% 0.0% 
Median non-amortizing. 
mortgage amount $28,736 $16,630  $41,909  $3,000  $3,826  n/ap 
Note: All dollar amounts are in 2008 $ 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data 
 
                                                
14 None of the Dos Pinos co-op buyers financed the purchase of their shares with a share loan. 
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The overwhelming share of first-lien mortgages received by the shared equity homebuyers were 
fixed-rate mortgages, with median interest rates that ranged from a low of 5.1 percent to a high of 
6.5 percent. The share loans in Atlanta, which had a median term of 5 years, had a higher median 
interest rate of 9.5 percent. This is not surprising, as co-op loans typically carry higher interest 
rates than mortgages originated for single-family home purchases. 
Homebuyers in only two programs (San Francisco and ARCH) financed their purchase with an 
amortizing second mortgage. Such a mortgage was used by only 7 percent of buyers in San 
Francisco, and the median amount (in 2008 $) was less than $10,000; the median amount of 
about $36,000 was higher at ARCH. A greater share of buyers used non-amortizing second 
mortgages to finance their purchase; these loans would be repaid in whole at resale. Nearly 
three-quarters of buyers in Duluth, about one-third of buyers in Boulder and nearly 12 percent of 
buyers in San Francisco used such a mortgage to finance their purchase. The median amount for 
these loans (in 2008 $) was relatively small (less than $4,000) in Boulder and Duluth, but was 
nearly $42,000 in San Francisco. In the first two programs, the loans were often used to cover 
closing costs. But to keep homes affordable to buyers with an income below 100 percent of area 
median in the high-priced market of San Francisco (the median home in the program sold for 
$298,000 in 2008 $), some homebuyers needed to receive a non-amortizing second mortgage 
that was payable when the home was sold. 
 
5. Preserving	Affordability	for	the	Units	upon	Resale	
Any shared equity program has two main objectives: provide homebuyers with a means to 
accumulate wealth while, at the same time, keeping the units affordable for subsequent 
homebuyers. Higher levels of appreciation realized by a seller (plus any capital improvements 
credited to the seller) will result in higher prices paid by subsequent buyers. To the extent that 
these subsequent buyers finance their purchase with mortgages that have the same interest rate 
as the reseller, and have similar amounts of funds for a down payment, higher resale prices will 
require that the new buyers have a higher income than the original purchaser of the home. 
There are many ways to measure the continuing affordability of renter-occupied or owner-
occupied housing, although every method begins with the basic assumption that “housing 
affordability is a measure of housing costs relative to income.”15 Previous analyses of changes to 
the affordability of shared equity homes have used the minimum income required to purchase a 
home as the ratio of the housing cost over the area’s median family income (MFI), published by 
HUD.16 To the extent that the ratio of the minimum income required to purchase a home relative to 
the MFI is the same, when a home is initially purchased and when that home is resold, the unit is 
considered to have maintained its affordability. (We refer to this method as the MFI method.) 
This MFI method measures, at two separate points in time, the required minimum income to 
                                                
15Goodman, Jack. 2001. Housing Affordability in the United States: Trends, Interpretations, and Outlook. A 
Report Prepared for the Millennial Housing Commission, page 3.  
16 See, for example, Davis, John Emmeus and Alice Stoke. 2009. Lands in Trust, Homes That Last: A 
Performance Evaluation of the Champlain Housing Trust. Burlington VT: Champlain Housing Trust. 
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purchase a given home relative to the MFI. A problem with this methodology is that it does not 
measure changes to a particular household’s income over time; rather, it assumes the incomes of 
the target population for whom shared equity homes are being kept affordable and to whom these 
homes are being resold increase at the same rate as the MFI. But, as discussed in an earlier 
section, the incomes of the families purchasing shared equity homes in all seven programs are 
well below the area median family income; and the minimum income required to purchase a 
shared equity home is often lower than the purchasers’ actual income. Given uneven income 
growth for families earning less than the median, using the MFI to calculate affordability may 
overstate the extent to which homes remain affordable to lower income families because the 
growth in MFI reflects changes to the types of households living in the area at the two different 
points in time (initial sale and resale) as well as changes to incomes for households that are 
present at both time periods.17 
Despite these drawbacks, the MFI method has two distinct advantages: its sensitivity to local area 
differences in incomes and family size; and its widespread use by policy analysts in evaluating 
major housing assistance programs funded by HUD, where eligibility is set by household income 
relative to median incomes in the local area.18 As a result, we also analyzed changes to the 
affordability of resold units, comparing changes in required income relative to MFI. 
Recognizing the issues associated with the MFI method, we first calculated the absolute changes 
in required real minimum income to purchase a home at resale. This measure establishes the 
required income growth for a given household to purchase a home at resale, and so identifies the 
extent to which a household earning the required minimum income at a given point in time can 
afford a unit when it is resold. Consequently, it is not dependent on an area’s changes in income 
distribution or household structure; rather, it provides information about the income growth 
required for a particular cohort of households to be able to afford a home at resale. 
In both of these analyses we calculated the minimum income that was necessary to initially 
purchase a shared equity home and the minimum income that was necessary when that same 
home subsequently resold. We assumed that the buyer would finance the purchase with a 30-
year, fixed rate mortgage that had an interest rate that was the median interest rate for all buyers. 
In addition, we assumed that the buyer paid a down payment that was equal to the median down 
payment share of all homes sold under the program, and further assumed that the buyer would 
spend no more than 33 percent for his/her income for housing (which included the mortgage 
payment and any property taxes or co-op fees reported by the program). We used a slightly 
different methodology to determine the required minimum income for initial and subsequent 
resales for the LEC programs (Dos Pinos and Wildwood) in which we calculated the minimum 
income required based on the co-op fees. For the Wildwood co-op in Atlanta, we included the 
homeowners’ payments for share loans (there are no share loans for any Dos Pinos buyers).  
                                                
17 See, for example, Gangl, Markus. 2008. “A Longitudinal Perspective on Income Inequality in the United 
States and Europe. Focus” Vol. 26(1). The author reports, using data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, that the income for households within the bottom three income deciles between 1992 and 1997 
either remained the same or declined during the five-year period.  
18 Goodman, page 17. 
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Changes in Absolute Real Required Income 
Based on the length of time between the two sales, we calculated the average annual increase in 
the required minimum income. For example, assume that a home, at its initial sale requires a 
minimum income (in 2008 $) of $20,000, and, at a resale that takes place 3 years later, requires a 
minimum income (in 2008 $) of $22,000. The real income at resale is 10 percent greater than at 
the initial sale, which means that the required minimum income increased by an average of 3.3 
percent per year. To the extent that real incomes increased by the same amount for households 
earning $20,000 at the time of the initial sale, the unit remains affordable to such households. 
The results in the table below show that the average real required minimum income increased by 
about no more than 1.0 percent per year in four of the seven sites. Because monthly co-op fees 
declined in real terms, the required real minimum income declined for Wildwood and Dos Pinos 
buyers. The average annual increase in required real minimum income was less than 1 percent 
for Thistle and San Francisco resale buyers. The required minimum income increased by an 
average of 1.1 percent per year for Burlington, and by 1.9 percent per year for NCLT and 4.0 
percent per year for ARCH homebuyers. In sites with greater cost increases, homebuyers may 
compensate by devoting a slightly higher share of their income to housing. 
With the exception of ARCH in Bellevue, the largest share of resold units had no more than a 10 
percent increase in the minimum income required to purchase resold homes, when compared to 
the minimum income required to purchase the home initially. In Boulder, 96 percent of Thistle’s 
resold homes required a minimum income that was no more than 10 percent of the minimum 
income required when the reseller purchased the home. The Dos Pinos co-op had a similar 
pattern. There are a greater share of resold units that had a change in minimum income required 
that was more than 10 percent for the ARCH, CHT, and NCLT programs. 
The extent to which units retained their affordability, given the annual increase in the required 
minimum income is dependent on income growth. Unfortunately, we do not have changes in 
incomes, by decile calculated for each of the seven sites that are based on a panel of households 
in the area. Therefore, we cannot make a definitive conclusion, from the changes in absolute 
income required, about changes in unit affordability. However, given analyses of changes in 
income by decile between 1992 and 1997 for a panel of households, it may be that incomes for 
households with an income in the lower end of the area income distribution had relatively small (if 
any) increases in annual real incomes. If this is the case, then even small annual changes in real 
required income may erode affordability.  
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Table 5: Summary of Changes in Required Minimum Income to Purchase Resold Shared 
Equity Homes 
  
Arch* 
(King 
County) 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
(Burlington) 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
(San Fran) 
Dos 
Pinos 
(Davis) 
NCLT 
(Duluth) 
Thistle 
Homes 
(Boulder) 
Wildwood 
Park 
(Atlanta) 
  
Required 
minimum income 
(in 2008 $) for 
initial buyers $35,548 $29,676 $83,836 $39,464 $22,436 $34,172 $21,011 
Mean annual 
change in real 
income needed 
to purchase a 
home at resale 4.0% 1.1% 0.3% -1.6% 1.9% 0.5% -0.7% 
Percent of units 
in which the 
required real 
minimum income 
was within 10% 
of the initial 
required real 
minimum income 31 52 58 67 60 83 61 
Percent of units 
in which required 
real  minimum 
income declined 
by ≥ 10% at 
resale 3 8 16 32 2 13 16 
Percent of units 
in which the 
required real 
minimum income 
increased by ≥ 
10% at resale 66 40 26 1 38 4 23 
Decile (in 2008) 
containing the 
required 
minimum income 
(in 2008 $) for a 
unit’s initial 
purchase 2 2 5 3 2 2 1 
* ARCH did not provide complete information on mortgages. Therefore, reported changes to the required minimum 
income of ARCH units are based on estimates where a buyer places a 5 percent down payment and finances the 
remaining purchase with a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage with a 6.0 percent interest rate. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations of client-level data; 1999 & Estimated 2008 Decile Distribution of Family Income by 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Non Metropolitan Counties: www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il08/FY2008_Medians.doc. 
 
Analysis of Changes in Relative Required Income 
To calculate the relative change in required minimum income, we created a ratio of (1) the initial 
required minimum income and the MFI at the time of the initial sale and (2) the required minimum 
income and the MFI at resale. The difference in these ratios indicates changes to the required 
minimum income as a share of MFI. Consider the following example: a home requires a minimum 
income of $20,000 at the initial sale, and the MFI at the time is $40,000. The required minimum 
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income is 50 percent of MFI. Assume, at the time the unit is resold, that the required minimum 
income is $30,000, and the MFI is $60,000. In this example, the required minimum income at 
resale is 50 percent of MFI, which is the same ratio as when the unit was initially sold. The results 
of our relative analysis of changes to required income is presented below.  
The required minimum income at the initial sale (employing the methodology discussed above) for 
homes that subsequently were resold ranges from a high of 86 percent of MFI in San Francisco to 
a low of 28 percent of MFI in Atlanta. For resold homes, median difference between the ratio of 
the required minimum income at resale and the area’s MFI was less than 2 percentage points 
greater than the same ratio at the initial sale in five (Burlington, Dos Pinos, NCLT, Thistle and 
Wildwood) of the seven sites (Table 6 and Figure 1). This suggests that units, in these programs, 
retained their affordability at resale.  
Figure 1: Changes in required income, as a share of MFI for all resold homes 
 
* ARCH did not provide complete information on mortgages. Therefore, reported changes to the required minimum 
income of ARCH units are based on estimates where a buyer places a 5 percent down payment and finances the 
remaining purchase with a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage with a 6.0 percent interest rate. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations of client-level data.  
The exceptions are for ARCH and San Francisco. The relatively large decline in affordability in 
ARCH may result from the program’s design in which resellers retain a large share of a unit’s 
appreciation. And that program reports that when it became aware many of their units were losing 
affordability, ARCH created a new resale index (the average of the real estate index and HUD 
median family income) that the program administrator believes will moderate future price 
increases. The San Francisco result is a function of a decline in MFI that took place between 
2004 and 2007, and so resales that took place during this period showed a loss in affordability 
relative to the MFI. 
Looking at the distribution of changes to the ratio for all sales, over 90 percent of all resales in five 
sites had changes to the ratio that was no more than 10 percentage points.  In the other two sites 
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(ARCH and San Francisco), more than one-third of homes resold had a change to the ratio that 
was more than 10 percentage points (Table 6). 
Table 6: Summary of Changes to Affordability for Shared Equity Homes 
  ARCH* 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Median Income 
needed at purchase 
as a percent of MFI 45.7% 44.4% 85.6% 61.6% 37.2% 39.4% 27.7% 
Median Income 
needed at resale as 
a percent of MFI 52.6% 45.9% 92.9% 58.7% 42.1% 38.1% 28.2% 
Median percentage 
point change in 
income needed as 
a percent of AMI, 
resale – purchase 5.2 0.9 6.7 -5.1 1.7 -1.2 0.3 
Percent of resales 
in which the 
minimum income 
(as a share of MFI) 
needed to buy a 
home varied by less 
than 10 percentage 
points  64% 93% 62% 79% 89% 96% 95% 
Percent of resales 
in which the 
minimum income 
(as a share of MFI) 
needed to buy a 
home declined by ≥ 
10 percentage 
points  1% 2% 4% 21% 2% 3% 2.5% 
Percent of resales 
in which the 
minimum income 
(as a share of MFI) 
needed to buy a 
home increased by 
≥ 10 percentage 
points  35% 5% 34% 0% 9% 1% 2.5% 
* ARCH did not provide complete information on mortgages. Therefore, reported changes to the cost of ARCH units are 
based on estimates where a buyer places a 5 percent down payment and finances the remaining purchase with a 30-
year, fixed-rate mortgage with a 6.0 percent interest rate. 
Note: The median percentage point difference is calculated by taking the median of all of the calculated changes in 
income relative to the area’s MFI. Therefore, the reported median difference is not the same as taking the difference 
between the median value of the required income at the initial sale and the required income at resale. 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data. 
 
The results from the analysis of changes in required income relative to area MFI are similar to the 
findings from the analysis of changes to absolute income. Units in the two cooperatives 
(Wildwood and Dos Pinos) and Thistle gained in affordability over time, whereas CHT’s units had 
a modest decline in affordability; ARCH and NCLT units had relatively larger declines in 
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affordability. In one site (San Francisco), the MFI analysis showed a large decline in affordability 
because many of the sales coincided with a time period in which MFIs declined. We believe, 
however, that San Francisco’s findings of changes to required absolute income more accurately 
reflect the extent to which that program’s homes remained affordable over time. The reason is 
that the absolute changes to the affordability of units sold by the program are not overly 
influenced by changes to a relatively small number of years’ MFIs. It is important to note that in all 
of these programs, the minimum real income required to purchase a shared equity home stayed 
well below the area median. Therefore, even for programs in which resold units lost some of their 
affordability, resold homes still remained within the reach of low-income households.  
6. Wealth	Creation	
This section analyzes the proceeds realized by shared equity homeowners when they resell their 
units and compares the return on their investment in a shared equity unit to earnings that could 
have been realized by them through renting and investing their down payments in either the stock 
market or the bond market.  
Appreciation and total proceeds realized by sellers 
Resellers’ proceeds come from the share of the appreciation that they are allowed to retain, given 
the program’s restrictions, the recovery of their original down payment, and the “forced savings” 
they realize on resale, resulting from principal payments they have made on all the mortgages 
used to finance the purchase of a house, condominium, or co-op share, or recouping costs from 
capital improvements. These components generated substantial amounts of proceeds for shared 
equity program participants.  
The appreciation (in 2008 $) realized by sellers ranged considerably across the sites—and also, 
as explored below, within sites. At the low end, the median owner in the Wildwood co-op realized 
just over $2,000 when she resold. In four more sites—CHT, Dos Pinos, NCLT and Thistle—the 
median reseller realized roughly between four and eight thousand dollars of appreciation. In San 
Francisco, where housing prices are considerably higher, the median reseller realized $17,501 in 
appreciation. The median reseller in the ARCH program—which has more generous resale 
formulas—realized $43,000 in appreciation (Table 7).  
In addition to the homeowners’ share of appreciation, the proceeds realized from the payment of 
a homeowner’s mortgage or share loan accounted for one-third and two-thirds of the total 
proceeds pocketed by resellers. The principal payments made by resellers during their tenure act 
as a forced savings program with owners recouping these savings at resale. Given average 
tenures of 3 to 6 years in most sites, these savings were relatively modest (although not 
insubstantial) because fixed-rate mortgages have relatively small principal payments in their first 
few years. Forced savings in the programs fell within a narrow band, ranging from $2,420 at the 
median in NCLT to $3,951 in San Francisco. Alone among the seven sites, the homebuyers at 
Dos Pinos did not receive share loans, so they did not accumulate wealth through amortization 
over the course of their occupancy in this limited equity cooperative. Additionally, some programs 
allowed owners to receive cash-out refinance loans during occupancy, but relatively few 
homeowners who resold their units had taken advantage of this opportunity, and, some resellers 
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received a credit for capital improvements that they made to their units during their tenure.  
Table 7: Summary of Appreciation Realized at Resale by Shared Equity Program 
Homeowners 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
 
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Median total proceeds n/av $17,501  $70,495  $19,585 $7,989  $13,043  $6,277  
Median appreciation 
realized by seller $42,524  $6,578  $17,321  $4,171  $4,297  $8,107  $2,015  
Median total of 
principal paid on 
mortgages (forced 
savings) and recovery 
of down payment plus 
closing costs)  n/av $6,027  $45,706  $18,363 $4,523  $8,567  $3,700  
Median down 
payment and 
closing costs n/av $2,749  $40,533  $18,363 $1,075  $6,080  $1,249  
Median amount of 
principal paid on 
mortgages (forced 
savings) reseller’s 
tenure n/av $3,051 $3,951 n/ap $2,420 $3,065 $2,564 
% who cash out 
refinance n/av 2.8% n/av n/ap 2.1% 17.4% 0.0% 
Median cash-out 
refinance amount for 
resellers who had such 
a refinance loan n/av $12,716  n/av n/ap $10,862  $3,462  n/ap 
Note: All dollar amounts are in 2008 $.  
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data. 
Rate of return realized by shared equity resellers 
Shared equity homebuyers, as discussed above, realized a significant amount of proceeds when 
they resold their units. This section analyzes the annualized rate of return that was realized by 
resellers, based upon the amount of appreciation that they received at resale relative to the 
amount of their original investment in purchasing their home (down payment plus closing costs). 
To determine the return, we calculated the internal rate of return (IRR), which is the interest rate 
(r) that yields a net present value of $0 for the following equation: 
n
n
n
t
t
t
r
EPR
r
ACF
r
ICO
)1()1()1( 10
0
+++=+ ∑=  
   Where: 
ICO0 = Initial cost to the owner (includes down payment plus initial fees), expressed 
as a negative number; 
ACFt = Annual cash flows in year t, which is the imputed rent of the unit minus after 
tax mortgage and insurance payments; and 
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EPRn = End of period return in time n when the home is sold, which is the sales 
proceeds realized by the homeowner, less unpaid principal balances of all 
mortgages outstanding as of the time of the sale.  
To add simplicity to the analysis, we assume that the rent paid by the owner, if he/she chose to 
rent the purchased home, would have been the same as the after-tax cost of owning a home. As 
a result, the annual cash flows are $0, and the IRR is calculated only using the ICO and EPR.  
This assumption, then, means that we do not include any differences between monthly mortgage 
payments or co-op loan and fees and the market rent for a comparable unit within the local MSA 
when calculating IRR. Other studies of LEC housing, for example, have included this difference 
when calculating potential return.19 Including that savings assumes that the only option available 
to buyers is to rent a comparably priced market-rate unit in the locality, and that the buyer could 
afford such a unit. Because we do not know buyers' willingness (or ability) to pay for housing, we 
cannot assume that they are saving the difference in the mortgage or co-op payments and market 
rents to include in a calculation of financial returns. Therefore, we exclude this potential financial 
benefit from our calculations.20 There are other benefits and costs to homeownership that we 
have also excluded from our analysis. Benefits include the deduction of house and mortgage 
interest paid from income tax liabilities, any homebuyer tax credits, and stabilization of housing 
payments (for those with fixed rate mortgages). Added costs include maintenance costs, realtor 
fees, and other transfer and transaction costs. 
In all programs the median rate of return realized by resellers was at least 6.5 percent, and was 
as high as 60.0 percent (Table 8). The rate of return is, in part, affected by the appreciation 
realized by the seller, and this appreciation is a function of the method used by each program to 
calculate allowable appreciation and the changes in the housing market or index used to calculate 
allowable appreciation. ARCH has the highest IRR across all of the programs because there was 
significant appreciation in the local market and because homebuyers under the program are 
permitted to retain much of the appreciation that is calculated. CHT in Burlington, NCLT in Duluth 
and Thistle in Boulder allow resellers to retain a portion (either 25 percent or 30 percent) of their 
homes’ appreciation, which is calculated by changes to the appraised value of homes during the 
time the reseller lived in the property. Because these programs allow resellers to retain a much 
smaller share of the appreciation, when compared to ARCH, resellers under these programs have 
a lower IRR. 
Holding other factors constant, a lower down payment results in a higher IRR, because the 
appreciation is realized on a smaller investment. Some of the difference in the median returns for 
sellers in a program are due to differences in the down payments made by homebuyers in the 
programs: Thistle’s homebuyers had a median down payment (in 2008 $) of $6,080, compared to 
                                                
19 See, for example, Thompson, David. 2004 “Dos Pinos Housing Cooperative in Davis, California from 1986 
to 2005: The Long-Term Value of Cooperative Homeownership versus Rental.” 2004 Cooperative Housing 
Journal: pp.5-9. 
20 For some sites, for example, NCLT, the median total monthly payment for all owners is close to the 
median gross rent in the surrounding city. Other sites, like Thistle, have median total monthly payments that 
are less than median gross rents, while San Francisco has monthly payments that exceed local median 
rents. 
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$2,749 for CHT’s buyers and $1,075 for NCLT homebuyers. Resellers in Atlanta’s Wildwood co-
op earned a median IRR of 14 percent, in part because share buyers could leverage their 
transaction with a share loan. This contrasts with the other LEC in our study, Dos Pinos, in which 
none of its purchasers used a share loan to finance their purchase, thereby reducing the amount 
of leverage and IRR for its co-op shareholders. 
Table 8: Rates of Return Realized by Shared Equity Homebuyers 
  ARCH* 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
 
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Program IRR 59.6% 30.8% 11.3% 6.5% 39.0% 22.1% 14.1% 
S&P 500 Index 
Fund IRR 9.4% 8.5% 3.2% 10.6% 2.8% -0.1% 7.8% 
10-year Treasury 
Bonds IRR 6.0% 6.0% 4.4% 7.8% 4.7% 5.9% 5.7% 
Traditional grant 
program IRR n/av 61.1% 31.0% n/ap 109.0% 75.5% n/ap 
* ARCH did not provide information on mortgages. Therefore, reported IRR for ARCH units is based on estimates where 
a buyer places a 5 percent down payment and finances the remaining purchase with a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage with 
a 6.0 percent interest rate. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations of client-level data; Treasury data: http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-
management/interest-rate/yield_historical_main.shtml; S&P 500 data: (http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/. 
 
The lower IRR for San Francisco partly results from the formula that it used to calculate 
appreciation for homes purchased prior to June, 2007. Some of the units in San Francisco, upon 
resale, were priced taking into account interest rates at the time that the unit was resold. The 
formula calculated the mortgage that a family could afford, given interest rates and a targeted 
household income set at 100 percent of area median. Therefore, maximum allowable home 
prices, at resale, moved inversely with interest rates: if the interest rate at the time of resale was 
higher than when it was purchased, then the resale price would be lower than the initial purchase 
price (holding changes in income constant). Given this formula, resale prices for a number of 
sellers were below the initial price paid, and the program’s median IRR was 11.3 percent, even 
though home prices in San Francisco had increased by nearly 10 percent annually between 2000 
and 2007. 
The median rate of return for resellers in all programs except for Dos Pinos was greater than the 
return that sellers would have realized if they had rented a unit and invested their down payment 
in either the stock market or purchased a 10-year Treasury bond at the time that they purchased 
their home. Had resellers invested their down payment amount in an S&P 500 index fund, they 
would have earned a median return ranging from a low of -0.1 percent in Thistle to a high of 10.6 
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percent in Dos Pinos. A comparable investment in 10-year Treasury bonds would have yielded a 
return, at the median, between 4.4 percent (in San Francisco) and 7.8 percent (in Dos Pinos).21 
In addition to comparing the returns realized by shared equity homeowners to stock and bond 
investments, we also calculated the return on investment that resellers would have realized if they 
had been allowed to retain 100 percent of their unit’s appreciation. This measure provides an 
estimate of the return that the resellers could have earned under an alternative method of 
subsidizing their purchase: one in which they receive a grant for the difference between their 
purchase price and the appraised value of the property and are then allowed to pocket all of this 
subsidy and all of the capital gains upon resale. 
Because resellers retained only a portion of their units’ appreciation, the IRRs that could have 
been realized if they could retain all of the appreciation would have been much greater (between 
2 and 6 times as great) than the median IRR actually realized by these resellers. But, allowing 
resellers to retain greater shares of the appreciation (and so realizing higher IRRs) would have 
increased resale prices and, therefore, the minimum income required to purchase the home at 
resale, thereby potentially eroding affordability. 
The median IRRs earned by resellers provide a summary statistic of returns realized by 
homebuyers under the shared equity programs. Although the median IRRs indicate that these 
homebuyers realized very good returns, not every reseller earned a positive return on his/her 
investment. As indicated in the following figure, resellers who sold their homes relatively soon 
(within 3-4 years) after purchasing their unit had a wide range of returns. 
                                                
21 We assume that resellers would hold their 10-year Treasury bonds until maturity, and so did not calculate 
any gains or losses that would have resulted from selling their bonds at the time that the owners sold their 
homes. 
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Figure 2: IRR and Tenure Length for Resellers Across all Shared Equity Programs 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data.  
The reason for this relationship is that home prices can swing wildly over a relatively short period 
of time, providing for some owners a very large gain, but for others, a large decline in value and, 
as a result, a negative IRR. The volatility of IRRs realized by shared equity program resellers 
declines as the length or tenure increases, as housing markets, over time show more stable rates 
of appreciation. 
Tradeoff between return and affordability  
Balancing the two competing objectives of building wealth and maintaining affordability is a 
challenge for any shared equity program. All of the programs studied in this report use 
appreciation formulas that allow units to be resold to buyers with incomes that are similar to the 
initial buyer, while providing a positive IRR for the sellers of these homes. 
But, there are patterns across the sites that demonstrate how approaches that increase the rate 
of return can decrease affordability, escalating the minimum income required to purchase homes 
at resale. ARCH and NCLT, for example, allow resellers to retain the highest share of 
appreciation among the sites. ARCH’s resellers were allowed to keep a large share of their unit’s 
appreciation (calculated using a local house price index), while NCLT allowed resellers to keep 30 
percent of a unit’s total appreciation. Due to these policies, the real minimum real income required 
to purchase homes at resale increased by 1.9 percent per year for NCLT homebuyers and by 4.0 
percent per year for ARCH homebuyers. 
Thistle and CHT resellers are allowed retain 25 percent of a unit’s appreciation, but that amount is 
reduced by the ratio of the price of the home when purchased divided by the market value of the 
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home. Assume, for example, that a home with that was appraised at $100,000 was purchased for 
$80,000. For such a home, the reseller would receive 80 percent of the unit’s appreciation times 
25 percent when resold. These policies, which reduce the amount of appreciation that can be 
realized by a seller, reduce each program’s IRRs, but they also reduce the rate of increase in the 
real minimum income required to purchase a home over time. The two co-op programs, by 
keeping co-op fees low in real terms, have had smaller changes in the minimum income required 
to purchase a share over time (assuming that the purchaser can afford to purchase the share by 
having funds available or by receiving a share loan). (See Table 9) 
There are factors, however, that influence program outcomes that are beyond any designer’s 
control. Thistle and CHT, for example, have very similar policies to calculate a reseller’s maximum 
allowable appreciation. Moreover, changes in house prices in the two programs’ metropolitan 
areas were about the same. Yet, the yearly required increase in minimum income to afford a 
resold unit is greater for CHT than in Thistle. The reason is that taxes and insurance costs, in real 
terms declined in Boulder, but increased in Burlington and that capital improvement 
reimbursements were also higher there. As a result, the minimum income required to purchase a 
home increased for CHT buyers, and remained the same for Thistle buyers.  
Programs, however, have discretion in selecting the formula they will use in setting the amount of 
appreciation that a reseller will retain. This decision, in turn, will affect the affordability of the units 
over time, when holding other factors constant. Sites face delicate decisions in establishing a 
shared equity program that allows resellers to earn a satisfactory return on their investment while 
still preserving affordability over time. The ARCH program, by allowing resellers to realize a large 
share of the appreciation provides very good returns to their homebuyers (the median IRR is 
nearly 60 percent), but 2/3 of resold units require a real minimum income that is at least 10 
percent greater than the initial purchaser. Alternatively, San Francisco’s program uses a formula 
to establish resale prices that limits appreciation amounts so that resold units are affordable to 
families earning 100 percent of area median. As a result, the median IRR earned by resellers is 
11.3 percent, but the required minimum income increased by only 0.3 percent per year between 
initial and subsequent resales.  
Shared equity programs can achieve a balance between a reasonable return and lasting 
affordability, even in strongly appreciating markets. Finding this balance may sometimes require a 
program’s to adjust its formula, as was done in San Francisco, in response to market conditions 
so that purchasers can realize returns that exceed those in alternative investments, but at the 
same time ensure that lower income families can afford to remain purchasers over time.  
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Table 9: Summary of Financial Outcomes for Shared Equity Programs  
  ARCH* 
Champlain 
Housing Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program Dos Pinos NCLT Thistle Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  (King County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Formula 
setting the 
resale price 
and maximum 
increase in 
equity that a 
seller can 
realize when 
transferring an 
ownership 
interest  
4 methods: 
Real Estate 
Index; HUD 
Med. Inc.; 
Average of 
above; 
1.125%/quarter 
Condos: 25% of 
appreciation; 
Single family 
homes: 25% of 
appreciation times 
the percentage of 
the property’s 
total value initially 
purchased by the 
homeowner  
3 methods: CPI 
index; median 
income buyer 
pays 33% of 
income; AMI 
index 
Increases by 
prime rate 
30% of market 
appreciation 
25% of 
appreciation 
times the 
percentage of 
the property’s 
total value 
initially 
purchased by 
the homeowner 
Preset dollar 
appreciation 
amount per 
year; 
appreciation 
increases 
periodically 
Down 
payment and 
closing costs 
amount paid n/av $2,749  $40,533  $18,363  $1,075  $6,080  $1,249  
Median % 
down 5.0% 2.6% 13.1% 100.0% 1.3% 4.8% 24.9% 
Real change 
in annual 
minimum 
income 
required at 
resale  4.0% 1.1% 0.3% -1.6% 1.9% 0.5% -0.7% 
Appreciation 
realized by 
seller $42,524  $6,578  $17,321  $4,171  $4,297  $8,107  $2,015  
Median length 
of tenure (in 
years) 3.3 5.2 4.2 4.0 3.3 3.4  6.6  
Program IRR 59.6% 30.8% 11.3% 6.5% 39.0% 22.1% 14.1% 
* ARCH did not provide information on mortgages. Therefore, reported IRR and changes to the affordability of ARCH units are based on estimates where a buyer 
places a 5 percent down payment and finances the remaining purchase with a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage with a 6.0 percent interest rate. 
Sources: Client-level data and program description
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7. Security	of	Tenure	
In the current economic environment, when so many low-income homeowners have lost their 
homes to foreclosure, security of tenure is an important outcome against which to judge shared 
equity programs. As a result of the mortgage meltdown, some policymakers have begun 
questioning the wisdom of programs that expand homeownership opportunities to lower income 
families. We investigated whether these programs better positioned their homebuyers in 
mortgages that were not high cost, and whether these buyers were better able to retain their 
homes, avoiding foreclosure and the intermediate step of delinquency. 
High-cost loans (also referred to as subprime loans) often contain features that increase the 
likelihood of borrower default. Some high-cost loans allow borrowers to make payments that are 
less than the amount required under a fully amortizing loan. In addition, many subprime loans are 
originated with low teaser rates that reset after a given period of time; borrowers oftentimes 
cannot afford payments with the new interest rate. The percentage of a homeownership 
program’s beneficiaries who have financed their homes using subprime loans is a leading 
indicator of the likelihood of future delinquency and foreclosure. 
Across the four non-cooperative sites where buyers took out mortgages and for which we have 
data,22 not a single borrower had a first mortgage with prepayment penalties. In these sites (CHT, 
San Francisco, NCLT, and Thistle), a very low share of loans were high cost, defined as having 
an interest rate more than 300 basis points above a comparable term yield. These sites range 
from a low of 0.4 percent of first liens that were high cost in NCLT to 2.3 percent in San Francisco 
(Table 10). Each of these four programs operated in housing markets where high-cost loans were 
more prevalent. At the low end, 4.3 percent of all mortgages on one to four family homes in 
Boulder, CO between 2004 and 2006 were high cost, according to data from the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA); nearly 15 percent of these home loans in the Duluth area were high 
cost.23  
                                                
22 Wildwood provided data on share loans. We do not include these loans in our high-cost loan calculation 
because co-op loans had much shorter terms (5 years), and are not as common as single-family mortgages. 
23 http://www.foreclosure-response.org/assets/hmda_08/. HMDA, which includes both lower and upper 
income buyers, defines high-cost loans as first-lien mortgages with an APR that is at least 300 basis points 
above the comparable term Treasury yield. We apply a similar definition to these home loans. Where 
available, we used yields on 30-year Treasury securities. This information is not available from February 
2002 to February 2006. The U.S. Department of Treasury provides, for those years, the 20-year Treasury 
security yield, which we use as an estimate for the 30-year yield. See 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield_historical_main.shtml 
and http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/ltcompositeindex.shtml. 
HMDA high cost loans are calculated using the Treasury yield on the 15th of a given month when the 
interest rate was determined. (Any interest rate determined before the 15th of a month is calculated using the 
previous month’s yield.) See Robert Avery, Kenneth Brevoort, and Glenn Canner. 2006. Higher-Priced 
Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data. For Thistle, we do not have the date the interest rate was 
determined, so we use the purchase date. 
27 
Table 10: High Cost Mortgages for Shared Equity Programs 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
% Prepayment 
penalties 
n/av 0.0% 0.0% n/ap 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
% High cost loans 
n/av 1.4% 2.3% n/ap 0.4% 1.2% n/ap 
% High cost loans 
in surrounding area 
n/ap 6.7% 6.8% n/ap 14.9% 4.3% n/ap 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data. 
Using client-level data, we calculated the share of current mortgage loans on homes that are 
seriously delinquent—that is, more than 90 days late on their mortgage payment. Very few homes 
are currently seriously delinquent. In the two cooperative programs—Dos Pinos and Wildwood—
no owners are currently delinquent on their share loan (in the case of Wildwood) or their monthly 
coop fees (for both sites). The other programs ranged from a delinquency rate of 0.4 to 2.7 
percent (Table 11). In four of the sites, the program’s delinquency rate is below the similar rate for 
the county as a whole—ARCH, Dos Pinos, Thistle, and Wildwood. 24 Two sites, CHT and NCLT, 
saw slightly higher rates of delinquency; these rates are roughly equivalent to the delinquency 
rate in the surrounding area. In these latter two programs with somewhat higher delinquency 
rates, it is worth noting, borrowers were the most highly leveraged: the median down payment 
was only 1.3 percent of the home’s purchase price in NCLT and only 2.6 percent in CHT. 
In addition, we calculated the share of all mortgages on homes (current or not) that had ever been 
seriously delinquent. The programs ranged from a low of 0.0 percent homes ever seriously 
delinquent at Wildwood to a high of 5.2 percent at NCLT. By comparison, 15.0 percent of FHA-
insured loans originated in 2004 had been delinquent at some point by 2008.25 
                                                
24 The county delinquency rates are reported by TransUnion and including upper income buyers. We 
accessed these data through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
http://data.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions/ 
25 Cumulative delinquency rates are not available. The FHA figures are nationwide. We calculated this figure 
from data at http://portal.hud.gov/fha/investment/5087-N-04_DPA_Pub_6-11-08.pdf. 
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Table 11: Security of Tenure for Shared Equity Programs 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
% Currently 
seriously 
delinquent 
0.4% 1.6% n/av 0.0% 2.7% 1.0% 0.0% 
% Currently 
seriously 
delinquent in 
county 
3.8% 1.4% n/ap 6.6% 2.5% 2.0% 8.3% 
% Ever seriously 
delinquent 
0.6% 3.5% n/av 0.4% 5.2% 2.3% 0.0% 
% Currently in 
foreclosure 
0.4% 0.5% n/av 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
% Currently in 
foreclosure in 
county 
1.2% 1.0% n/ap 3.4% 4.4% 1.1% 5.6% 
% Ever in 
foreclosure 
0.6% 2.2% n/av 0.0% 3.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
Number of units 
lost from program 
due to foreclosure 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Number of units 
bought out of REO 
or deed-in-lieu 
1 10 0 0 3 0 0 
% Remain 
homeowners after 
five years 
n/av 91.8 n/av n/av 95.0% 91.2% n/av 
Source: Authors’ calculations of client-level data. 
Losing a home to foreclosure is a wrenching event for an owner, who ends up losing a place to 
live and any equity she has invested in the property. But a foreclosed home is also a setback for 
the program. In the event of foreclosure, a shared equity program risks losing the property from its 
portfolio, with the accompanying loss of all public subsidies that have been invested in the 
property and all restrictions on occupancy and affordability. 
Three programs—Wildwood Park, Dos Pinos, and Thistle—had no homes presently in foreclosure 
as of the end of 2009 and the highest foreclosure rate was NCLT at 1.1 percent.26. In every 
program, the site’s foreclosure rates were below that of their surrounding areas as of 2009. 27  
Over these programs’ histories, the two LECs have never had a foreclosure. Thistle and ARCH’s 
cumulative foreclosure rate is just 0.6 percent—just 1 Thistle home and 4 ARCH homes have 
                                                
26 Note that this refers to homes where lenders have initiated the foreclosure process, not where a 
foreclosure has been completed. 
27 http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/nsp_foreclosure_data.html 
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gone into foreclosure. At Thistle, the home that entered foreclosure was lost from its portfolio. At 
ARCH, 2 of the 4 homes are still in foreclosure, one was purchased by the program out of 
foreclosure, and 1 was lost from the ARCH’s portfolio. CHT and NCLT had somewhat higher 
cumulative foreclosure rates—2.2 and 3.0 percent. In Duluth, 2 of the 7 homes that have entered 
foreclosure were cured, while another 2 are currently in the foreclosure process and may yet be 
cured; the program purchased the remaining three out of REO to prevent losing the homes. Of the 
15 CHT homes that have entered foreclosure, 2 are currently in foreclosure and three 
foreclosures have been cured, with the homeowner able to keep her home. Seven homeowners 
have lost their homes due to a completed foreclosure, and three more had their homes 
purchased by CHT so that their lender could not complete a foreclosure process. For the seven 
foreclosures completed, CHT bought back the home through a REO sale; the other 3 homes 
were resold to the existing owner. Cumulative foreclosure rates in the seven sites are well below 
national cumulative foreclosure rates:2.3 percent of FHA-insured home loans originated in 1998 
were in foreclosure after four years28; in 2008, 4.2 percent of FHA-insured home loans originated 
in 2004 were in foreclosure29. Additionally, most sites achieved a low foreclosure rate compared 
to the rate among all FHA-insured homes while serving a clientele having a much lower income 
than the average household purchasing an FHA-insured home. 
A final measure of how effective the shared equity programs have been in not only helping low 
income families to attain homeownership but to sustain it is the percentage of buyers who remain 
homeowners five years after they purchase a home. We counted a buyer as a continued 
homeowner if, after five years, she remains in her original shared equity home, or has moved into 
another owner-occupied market-rate or shared-equity home. We only have data from three of the 
seven sites, but in all three, over 90 percent of buyers were still homeowners after five years. This 
is an impressive rate, considering that all were low-income and almost were all first-time 
homeowners. By comparison, previous studies have found that roughly half of all low-income 
homebuyers fail to remain homeowners five years after acquiring a home.30 
 
8. Mobility	Findings	
Families move frequently. According to the American Community Survey, in 2008, about 13 
percent of the U.S. population moved to a new address, though rates are higher for renters than 
homeowners. High rates of mobility nationally raise key questions for shared equity 
homeownership programs. Does the purchase of a shared equity home limit mobility? Are families 
reluctant to sell their homes because the housing market has outpaced their appreciation? Or 
conversely, do some types of shared equity homeownership result in fewer moves, promoting 
cohesive communities? To inform these questions, we assessed the rates at which participants 
                                                
28 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02773.pdf. 
29 http://portal.hud.gov/fha/investment/5087-N-04_DPA_Pub_6-11-08.pdf. 
30 Herbert, Chris and Belsky, Eric. “The Homeownership Experience of Low-income and Minority 
Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature.” Cityscape 10 (2), 2008; and 
http://frpo.org/Document/Topics&Issues/Renting%20vs.%20Owning/Achieving%20American%20Dream%20
Katz%20Reid.pdf. 
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moved and their average length of tenure. We also conducted a survey of movers to get at their 
motivations for moving, the destination of their move, and the type of home they moved into. 
It does not appear that the owners of shared equity homes are moving at substantially lower rates 
than other first-time homebuyers. 31 All sites saw average mobility rates within a fairly narrow 
range. At the low end, CHT saw 5.5 percent of their homes turn over annually (Table 12). Thistle 
and ARCH had annual mobility rates of 6.9 percent and Wildwood at 7.3 percent. The final two 
sites saw 1 in 12 homes resell a year (8.4 percent at NCLT and 8.6 percent in Dos Pinos). 
A different way to look at this same information is to calculate the length of tenure for families who 
move. Across the life of these programs, the median length of tenure for movers in most sites was 
three to four years. Two sites were slightly higher; CHT and Wildwood resellers lived in their 
home 5.2 and 6.6 years, respectively. Looking both at the percentage of homeowners who moved 
annually and their length of tenure, we do not see evidence that homeowners in the programs 
were stuck in place. 
Research has established that some families move because of positive changes in a family’s 
circumstances, such as buying a bigger home to fit a growing family or moving to be close to a 
new job.32 But mobility can also be a symptom of instability and insecurity. To gain a better 
understanding of why shared equity buyers moved and what their housing outcomes were, we 
conducted a short web-based survey of movers.33 
Of those who responded, most movers from the Thistle program reported they left for family 
reasons, followed by housing or neighborhood reasons, and job reasons (see Table 12).34 At both 
NCLT and Thistle, the most frequently cited reason for moving was a change in martial status. 
This was confirmed in discussions with program staff, who stated that many households in 
program were female-headed, and several of these women moved after getting married. CHT 
movers cited housing and neighborhood reasons as the primary drivers in their decision to move, 
while Dos Pinos movers referenced job related reasons. Except for CHT, where a number of 
families moved because they wanted a better house or apartment, relatively few movers left for 
what may be considered negative reasons (wanting cheaper housing, a better home, or a better 
neighborhood). These responses paint a picture of most owners leaving their homes not in 
                                                
31 Comparison data from the National Association of Home Builders: 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=110770&print=true. Note that 
comparison data can only be calculated for those with information on whether they are first-time 
homebuyers. 
32 “Residential Mobility and Neighborhood Change: New Evidence and Implication for Community Initiatives.” 
Claudia Coulton, Brett Theodos, and Margery A. Turner. 
33 Three programs—ARCH, the San Francisco City Inclusionary Affordable Housing Program, and 
Wildwood—were not able to conduct mobility surveys as they do not maintain contact information for 
residents who have left the program. 
34 Family reasons include: change in martial status, establish own household, or other family reason. Job 
reasons include: new job or job transfer,  to look for work or lost job, to be closer to work/easier commute, 
retired, or other job-related reason. Housing and neighborhood reasons include: wanted to own home, not 
rent, wanted new or better house/ apartment, wanted better neighborhood/less crime, wanted cheaper 
housing, or other housing reason. Other reasons include: to attend or leave college, change of climate, 
health reasons, or a natural disaster. 
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financial stress or reluctantly, but in response to family, life cycle, and employment changes.  
Table 12: Mobility for Shared Equity Programs 
  ARCH 
Champlain 
Housing 
Trust 
Citywide 
Inclusionary 
Affordable 
Housing 
Program 
Dos 
Pinos NCLT 
Thistle 
Homes 
Wildwood 
Park 
  
(King 
County) (Burlington) (San Fran) (Davis) (Duluth) (Boulder) (Atlanta) 
Annual average 
move rate 6.9 5.5 n/av 8.6 
8.4 (after 
'04) 6.9% 7.3 
Median length of 
tenure (years) 3.3 5.2 4.2 4.0 3.3 3.4 6.6 
Main reason for moving 
% Family 
reason n/av 27% n/av 36% 39% 53% n/av 
% Job reason n/av 14% n/av 30% 25% 16% n/av 
% Housing and 
neighborhood 
reason n/av 42% n/av 36% 25% 21% n/av 
% Remaining 
within same county n/av 61% n/av 40% 67% 48.7% n/av 
% Moving to 
owner-occupied, 
market rate 
housing n/av 68% n/av 54% 78% 71.8% n/av 
Sources: Survey of shared equity program resellers and Current Population Survey 
Nationally, most movers resettle near the home they are leaving. We found this to also be the 
case for two of the programs—NCLT and CHT—where roughly 2 out of 3 movers stayed in the 
same county. Resellers from the two programs with high surrounding housing costs, Dos Pinos 
and Thistle, tended to move further than the national average. Just 40 percent of Dos Pinos 
resellers and 49 percent of Thistle movers stayed within the same county. However, most of those 
who moved out of a shared equity home stayed within the same state. 
Finally, we asked movers about the tenure of housing they moved into after reselling their home. 
This measure is an important outcome of residential and economic mobility. Of the sites for which 
we had data, three had a high proportion of movers report transitioning into another owner-
occupied home. Of these, most purchased market-rate housing: 68 percent of CHT’s movers, 72 
percent of Thistle’s movers, and 78 percent of NCLT’s movers did so. With proceeds, at the 
median, of nearly $19,600, Dos Pinos movers had accumulated funds for a moderate down 
payment on their next home. However, a sizable share of movers, 42 percent, shifted to rental 
housing subsequent to leaving their Dos Pinos home. 
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9. Conclusion	
Shared equity programs have been promoted as a cost-effective method to help low-income 
families build wealth through sustainable homeownership, while at the same time providing a 
permanent supply of units that remain affordable over time. The shared equity programs analyzed 
in this study support these claims: these programs sold homes and cooperative units to families 
with incomes ranging from a low of 35 percent of MFI to 73 percent of MFI. Moreover, the income 
of buyers remained relatively low, when compared to MFI for all of the years in which programs 
sold their homes.  
The shared equity programs delivered on their goal of helping lower income families build wealth: 
families realized sizable proceeds when selling their homes: from $6,300 for Wildwood resellers 
to $70,000 for program participants in San Francisco. Moreover, because most homebuyers 
purchased their units with a relatively small down payment, the internal rates of return across all 
programs but one outpaced the gains that resellers would have earned had they invested their 
down payments in stocks or bonds. By accumulating wealth, many of the purchasers of shared 
equity homes are able to acquire market-rate owner-occupied homes. Moreover, shared equity 
programs, by recycling subsidies, offer a less expensive method of supporting homeownership 
than initiatives that provide grants to families to purchase market-rate homes. 
Shared equity programs not only help families accumulate wealth, but for 5 of the 7 the programs 
studies in this report, increases to the real income required to purchase a unit at resale were, on 
average, less than 1.1 percent per year. Therefore, to the extent that lower income families’ 
incomes increased at a rate of about 1 percent per year, units retained their affordability over 
time, thereby creating opportunities for subsequent lower income families to generate wealth. 
Moreover, the change in the required minimum income, as a proportion of MFI, required at resale 
was less than 1 percentage point for 4 of 7 programs. By this measure, units remained affordable 
to the extent that lower income families’ incomes increased at the same rate as the area MFI. It is 
important to note that in all of the programs, the minimum required income to purchase homes is 
well below the area median. Therefore, even for programs in which resold units lost some of their 
affordability, resold homes remain within reach of low-income households.  
Given the current foreclosure crisis, which reduced homeownership rates, shared equity 
programs stand out for the extent to which buyers are able to stay current on their mortgages and 
remain in their homes until they wish to sell. Although homeowners earn well below median 
incomes, very few had their loan go into foreclosure. In large part, the low foreclosure rate reflects 
the type of loans received by homebuyers: most purchase loans are 30-year, fixed-rate 
mortgages. Rather than use high-cost loans, homebuyers finance their purchases with mortgages 
or share loans that are underwritten with standards that allow for sustainable homeownership 
over time. For the three sites where we have data, over 90 percent of buyers were still 
homeowners after five years, much higher than comparable first-time homeowners. 
It does not appear that limits on the equity that shared equity programs place on their resident 
members limit mobility. The owners of shared equity homes are moving at comparable rates to 
other first-time homebuyers. Most owners report leaving their homes not in financial stress or 
reluctantly, but in response to family, life cycle, and employment changes. In two programs—
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NCLT and CHT—most movers resettle near the home they are leaving. But resellers from the two 
programs with high surrounding housing costs—Dos Pinos and Thistle—tended to move further 
than the national average. Of the sites for which we had data, three had a high proportion of 
movers report transitioning into another owner-occupied home. 
The outcomes are not related to the type of shared equity model (community land trust, deed 
restriction or co-op). Rather, within each type of approach, decisions regarding the resale formula 
used to calculate allowable appreciation and conditions in the local housing market affect 
outcomes much more than the particular model of shared equity homeownership. 
This study analyzed seven shared equity programs: there are a many more such programs 
operating throughout the country. Of final note, the data elements used in this study can be 
collected by all shared equity homeownership programs using the data protocols presented in the 
appendix. The sites analyzed in this report had to dedicate resources to input data into the 
collection protocol. To reduce these costs in the future, program staff should collect these data 
elements for all initial and subsequent resales, on a routine basis and in electronic form. This 
would allow programs to monitor their own performance with respect to their objectives of 
promoting sustainable homeownership opportunities and would allow outside researchers to 
measure the performance of these programs over time. 
 
